Characterizing the Probability Law on Time Until Core Damage With PRA by Wortman, Martin et al.
Characterizing the Probability Law on Time
Until Core Damage With PRA:
Consequences of Assuming Poisson Initiating Event Processes
Martin Wortman, Ernest Kee, & Paul Nelson
Texas A&M University
Wednesday 2nd September, 2020: 01:18
Summary
Certain modeling assumptions underlying Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)
allow a simple computation of core damage frequency (CDF ). These assumptions
also guarantee that the time remaining until a core damage event follows an
exponential distribution having parameter value equal to that computed for the
CDF. While it is commonly understood that these modeling assumptions lead to
an approximate characterization of uncertainty, we offer a simple argument that
explains why the resulting exponential time until core damage distribution under–
estimates risk. Our explanation will first review operational physics properties
of hazard functions, and then offer a non–measure–theoretic argument to reveal
the the consequences of these properties for PRA.1 We will then conclude with a
brief discussion that connects intuition with our analytical development.
1 The conclusions offered, here, hold for any possible operating history that respects the
underlying assumptions of PRA. Hence, the measure–theoretic constructs on filtered probability
spaces is unnecessary for our developments.
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1 Risk and Rational Hazard
A nuclear reactor can experience at most one core damage event. This catas-
trophic terminus is the central outcome with respect to which we shall charac-
terize risk. In particular, we recognize the probability law on the time until core
damage as a finite–characterization of risk. To this end, Probabilistic Risk As-
sessment (PRA) offers a means for computing the probability distribution on the
time until core damage. The PRA methodology relies on certain assumptions
that may or may not agree with physics characterizing reactor operations. When
these assumptions are not in harmony with the underlying operational physics,
the PRA assessment of risk becomes (at best) approximate; the quality of the
approximated probability law yielded by PRA remains an open question.
In the development that follows, we will identify physical and operational
features that are generally shared by any maintained system (e.g., a nuclear re-
actor) that can potentially succumb to a catastrophic failure. We then review the
analytical assumptions underlying PRA and rationalize these assumptions with
the previously identified physical and operational features. We will then identify
direct implications on risk (i.e., the probability distribution on time until core
damage) when the assumptions underlying PRA cannot be completely rational-
ized. We will conclude that PRA generally underestimates risk. Finally, we cite
some well–known results that help reveal the implicit difficulties in quantifying
the quality of PRA generated approximations of risk ... which remains a very
important open research question.
Physical and Operational Features of Maintained Systems: A main-
tained system can be described, “Any system where restorative action is taken
to lessen the likelihood of failure.” We shall characterize the likelihood of failure
in the usual probabilistic sense as R(t) , P (T > t), with the random variable
T being the time of first system failure after time t = 0. Thus, we accept that
T is a continuous nonnegative random variable. We note that, the likelihood of
failure is, thus, parametrically characterized by the hazard function h(t), where
R(t) = e−
∫ t
0 h(s)ds (1)
where,
h(t) , lim
s↓0
1
s
P (T ≤ t + s|T > t).
It follows that by differentiating (1) that
h(t) =
−dR(t)
R(t)
.
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Consider Figure 1 showing a hypothetical hazard function behavior follow-
ing maintenance interventions (epochs) that result in discontinuities; we do not
require that h(t) be continuous.2 Importantly, note that h(t) and R(t) carry
exactly the same information (as one is uniquely determined by the other). This
information includes a given (fixed) history of maintenance prior to the epoch of
first system failure. For any given maintenance history, there will correspond a
unique hazard trajectory h(t), t ≥ 0. Further, operational physics requires that
any fixed hazard trajectory h(t) should have the following properties that we
identify as principles of rational hazard.
Principles of Rational Hazard
1. 0 < h(t) <∞, ∀t ≥ 0; hazard is positive and finite.
2. lims↓0 h(t + s) = h(t), ∀t, s ≥ 0; hazard is right–continuous.
3. lims↓0
h(t+s)−h(t)
t−s ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ 0; hazard is non–decreasing almost everywhere.
4. lims↓0 h(t) − h(t − s) < 0; hazard decreases only at each of the (at most
countable number of) epochs of successful maintenance.
5. h(0) = inft≥0 h(t); without loss of generality, the system is as good–as–new
at time zero.
Returning, now, to the characterization of general maintained systems, we
introduce the follow proposition.
Proposition. Maintained systems satisfying the principles of rational hazard
have a time of first failure complementary distribution R(t) that is stochastically
ordered with respect to e−h(0)t, t ≥ 0.
Proof. By eq(1) the complimentary distribution of time of first failure is given
by R(t) = e−
∫ t
0 h(s)ds, t ≥ 0. Appealing to the Principles of Rational Hazard, it
follows from principles 1 and 2 that h(t) is integrable on t ≥ 0. It then follows
from principles 3 and 4 that
∫ t
0
h(s)ds must be positive, finite, and monotone
nondecreasing. Thus,
{inf
t≥0
h(t)}t ≤
∫ t
0
h(s)ds,
and by principle 5,
h(0)t ≤
∫ t
0
h(s)ds.
2 The hazard h(t), i.e., the propensity for first system failure in the next instant of time, will
surely be discontinuous with downward jumps at epochs of successful maintenance.
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Figure 1: Trajectory of a hypothetical hazard for a fixed degradation and mainte-
nance.
Exponentiating now shows that for every possible trajectory of rational hazard
e−h(0)t ≥ e−
∫ t
0 h(s)ds,
or equivalently,
P (T ≤ t) ≥ 1− e−h(0)t,∀t ≥ 0.
We now observe that since time t = 0 can, without loss of generality, be set
to any maintenance epoch that returns the system to a good–as–new condition,
maintained systems that conform to the principles of rational hazard will have a
time of first failure distribution (for all possible maintenance trajectories) that is
bounded above by an exponential distribution with parameter equal to the initial
hazard.
Remark. The above proposition, unto itself, is not especially noteworthy, since
intuition easily suggests exactly what proof formalizes: Disregarding the effects of
degradation on a maintained system will surely lead to under–estimating failure
risk. However, we can leverage this proposition to obtain deeper insights regarding
the consequences of Poisson assumptions that underlie PRA.
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2 Approximations Using PRA
The general stochastic processes governing a maintained system’s temporal be-
havior prior to core damage are so complicated as to go beyond practical compu-
tational analysis. Hence, simplified models are employed that yield approximate
characterizations of core damage risk: PRA is the most commonly used method-
ology to quantify core damage risk. Essential to the PRA methodology is that
the first (and only) core damage events arrives according to a Poisson process.3
An analytical consequence of Poisson arrivals is that the time until the first (and
only) core damage event follows an exponential distribution, and the parameter
of this distribution takes a value identical to what is termed core damage fre-
quency (CDF ).4 A specific value of CDF is computed using the PRA predictive
modeling methodology and noting that
h = CDF =
1
E[T ]
,
we have that
R(t) = P (T > t) = e−ht, t ≥ 0. (2)
Clearly, when core damage is approximated as a Poisson arrival, the practical
effects of degradation and maintenance are not represented. That is, Poisson
arrivals assume that the system hazard remains constant over all time.5 Hence,
by PRA approximation, a system remains in the good–as–new condition until the
occurrence of core damage.
Practitioners, of course, recognize that the constant hazard trajectories char-
acteristic of PRA are inconsistent with reality. Thus, the quality of core damage
risk characterization of eq(2) is of central importance. To this end, we note that
all stochastic approximations can be classified according to one of two proper-
ties: 1) the approximation provides a bound, or 2) the approximation does not
provide a bound. Bounding approximations are typically ordinal, giving a means
to gauge true system performance as being “at least as good as” or “never any
3 Although other reactors at large commercial multi-unit sites may continue to operate (for
example, the Three Mile Island site experience and the Chernobyl experience), the reactor(s)
involved in the accident is(are) have historically been decommissioned. An exception may be
Fukushima where three reactors avoided core damage but have not yet been restarted.
4 Clearly, CDF does not imply that there exists multiple core damage events; the (assumed
Poisson) arrival process of core damage terminates upon a damage epoch. Thus, it is well
understood that CDF simply refers to expected number of arrivals per-unit time of the un-
terminated Poisson model characterizing the time of the first (and only) core damage event.
5 Note that the constant hazard, characteristic of eq(2), satisfies each of the five principles
of rational hazard.
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worse than” characterizations. Non-bounding approximations typically rely on a
distance metric, where system performance can be gauged as within some quan-
tifiable (computable) distance from the approximation.
Under the principles of rational hazard and the concomitant stochastic or-
dering proposition, the PRA approximation of eq(2) represents an uninformative
lower bound on core damage risk. That is: “The risk of core damage by time t
will always be higher than that predicted by the PRA approximation.”6
In order to improve the quality of the PRA approximation one could seek to
relax one or more of the rational hazard principles with the objective of find-
ing either a better bound or a quantifiable distance metric between the PRA
approximation and stochastic system behavior. However, it is unlikely that the
PRA approximation can be used to obtain a better bound or quantify distance
to stochastic system behavior without a more detailed characterization of degra-
dation and maintenance. Including degradation and maintenance information
(e.g., histories of equipment failure and repair) reveals the difficulties in model-
ing hazard processes which are generally represented as the stochastic intensity
of certain underlying marked–point processes.
Finally, we note that there exists a large and established literature reporting
results on approximating general stochastic point processes by Poisson processes.
This line of investigation largely centers on “Stein’s Method” (also referred to as
the “Stein–Chen” method) to develop bounds on distance metrics characterizing
how closely a Poisson process approximates a stationary point process. The works
of Barbour and Holst (1989), Chen and Xia (2004), and Chatterjee et al. (2005)
and their references provide a fairly complete coverage of the state–of–the–art in
Poisson approximations. While these bounded distance metrics provide useful de-
vices in proving certain contraction properties associated with weak–convergence
arguments for limit theorems, none lends itself to direct quantification. Only in-
cremental progress along this line of investigation has been made in recent years.
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